Sedentarization and 'development ', under Israeli Occupation (1967-1982 and subsequent Egyptian rule, have eroded the agropastoral livelihoods of South Sinai Bedu and the strong cultural identity that evolved from them. Unequal access to work and poor education have produced material poverty, while government policy to 'Egyptianize' Sinai has marginalized Bedouin culture. This article explores the impacts on Bedu of living with multiple inequalities, and the strategies people employ to validate themselves in a system that disdains or ignores them. Among the most important is adopting a self-appointed role as guardians of nature. Bedu are choosing to reformulate an environmental identity as an act of symbolic resistance to Egyptianization, and to a neglect of the environment that they feel, with good reason, extends to them.
Introduction
The view that the identity of different peoples is immutably shaped by aspects of their culture denies the plurality of human identity, and people's individual and collective agency in choosing how they should be represented (Sen 2006) . Dominant discourse in Egypt has never moved beyond a reductionist portrayal of Bedu as primitive pastoralists, uneducated and troublesome (Gardner 2000; Aziz 2000; Altorki and Cole 2006) . In this essentialized view, an educated or wish to be treated as equals. Most are unable or unwilling to do so. They thus remain assigned to the conceptual realm of 'nature' rather than 'culture', a 'traditional' people whose aspirations and rights as citizens can safely be addressed through conservation.
In reality, of course, Bedouin identity is dynamic and continually changing, shaped in relation to what Hall and du Gay (1996: 4) term the 'constitutive discourses, which have impinged upon populations in the course of modernization. Whilst remaining linked to origins in an historical past, Hall and du Gay comment, 'actually identities are about ... the process of becoming rather than being'. When local communities forge a collective identity in response to a threat, political struggle often plays an important part in the process (Dalby and Mackenzie 1997) ; however, political activity in Egypt remains subject to massive control and forbidden to civil society. Bedu have hitherto had neither incentive nor inclination for civic engagement, 1 and the state's security presence makes physical resistance all-but unthinkable. How, then, can Sinai Bedu assert their evolving identity?
As Abu-Lughod (1990: 41) notes, Bedouin resistance takes unlikely forms: 'subversions ... [ -] small or local resistances not tied to the overthrow of systems or ideologies of emancipation'. In this article I explore how South Sinai Bedu think about and represent themselves today in the face of multiple inequalities. I illustrate tactics employed as 'everyday resistance' (Scott 1985) , to shore up selfrespect in the face of disrespect. I then suggest that South Sinai Bedu draw selectively on aspects of their historic identity to resist their marginalization by those they experience as occupiers, noting different strategies adopted in the face Bedouin identity remains grounded in a relationship with the natural environment, and that a reworking of that historic aspect -in opposition to the authoritieshelps people restore meaning to their position as Bedu today.
Since well before the Islamic era, Sinai's indigenous population has consisted of occupation, settlement and rapid economic change produced wholesale shifts away from pre-development Bedouin livelihoods of semi-nomadic pastoralism, resumed, South Sinai has experienced rapid commercial development through tourism and substantial donor investment. An analysis for the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (SEAM 2005: 20) concluded that 'the Bedouin can 2 Bedu remain among the poorest and most marginalized of Egyptian citizens; a position reinforced by the government policy of settling mainland Egyptians in large numbers in the peninsula, backed by a massive security presence. Development on this scale threatens the environment, and the government has responded by designating almost 40 per cent of South Sinai's landmass and littoral as Protected Areas (PAs). The St Katherine Protectorate (StKP), established in 1996, originally involved Bedu in its planning. Alternative livelihoods and 'sustainable' development these promises were not delivered, and Egyptian-led development proceeded unchecked despite conservation measures enshrined in law (Sowers 2007 ). Most national government -for failing both the environment and their community.
Having visited St Katherine regularly for 25 years, 3 I have observed the area's rapid development, and the emergence from it of two paradoxes. First, while Economic prosperity has created, and left behind, a marginal people. The second park and UNESCO World Heritage Site; yet -like Egypt's conservation effort as a whole -its work is undermined by lack of funding and political support (NCS 2006) . Developments have been permitted that contradict the conservation recently mooted include settling up to 4.5 million Nile Valley Egyptians in Sinai, a tarmacked road through the Protectorate's most beautiful wadi, a giant bridge between Sharm and Saudi Arabia, and a funicular railway up Mount Sinai. The plan for Sinai's development approved by President Morsi's Cabinet on 20 June 2013 provided for the growth of extractive industry on a previously undreamt-of scale (PEMA 2013 ). Despite conservation rhetoric, then, South Sinai's environment has not been a real priority for any of Egypt's recent regimes.
My study explores the relationship between environmental neglect and Bedouin marginalization. 4 
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NOMADIC PEOPLES (2013) VOLUME 17 ISSUE 2 development and conservation experienced as control, noting spatial differences that include marked hostility among town-dwellers to state-led conservation. I seek to explain this as a response to a perceived existential threat, leading to the 'reinvention' of Bedouin environmental identity as an act of resistance.
Bedouin Life: Building Blocks been found in some form, namely: tribal social organization supporting strong kinship networks; value systems based on ideas of honour upheld by customary law; and livelihoods based primarily on nomadic pastoralism. Abu Rabi'a (2006: 865) summarizes the social structure of Bedouin tribes: 'in ascending order ... the nuclear family, the extended family, the sub-tribe, the tribe and the clan. The traditional Bedouin family was patrilineal, patrilocal, this remains current in South Sinai, which is acknowledged as conservative compared with neighbouring areas (Marx 1967) . Tribal alliances and loyalties remain active and are renegotiated as circumstances require. The khamsa generation kinship structure which assumes the extended family's responsibility, under customary (' ) law, for matters of honour and its defence, is active and frequently invoked.
The Bedouin patrilineal segmentary lineage system, being organized around collective, lineage-based responsibility and lacking a formal leadership hierarchy, has led to the contested claim that Bedouin society is egalitarian in nature. Today, many factors challenge that claim: sedentarization and state control increasingly produce material and social inequality, to say nothing of new or existing gender disparities. However, despite (or perhaps because of) their increasingly polarized society, my respondents continue to value ideas of structural equality, with no-one owed deference as of right; and material equality, traditionally produced by the impermanence of livestock-based wealth and the common holding of land and natural resources (Salzman 1999) . While leaders emerge and may be wealthy, Bedu play down wealth relative to values they consider more important, such as honour, ancestry and generosity (Marx 1967; Abu-Lughod 1985; Peters 1990 ). Traditionally, kudos was more readily earned by giving wealth away than by accumulation (Salzman 1999; Lavie 1990; Bailey 2004 poor, replied that they sold it. All those who have produce keep some back to give away or serve to guests. Refusing to commodify their scarce resources in conformity with prevailing economics -or even the needs of their own families -they choose instead to use them as tokens of generosity. This wins them baraka (blessings) in religious terms, but more importantly weaves new threads into the webs of generosity and reciprocal obligation on which Bedouin social relations depend. Given the chance to control resources, they use them to reinforce a key aspect of their identity as Bedu (H.C. Gilbert, unpublished data). A way of life based on nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism is the most grazing and watering locations, and living typically in easily dismantled tents in a remote area said simply: 'Herding is the Bedu's life.' 6 Sinai's population by Bedu extends from the pre-Islamic era to the 18th century ce (Murray 1935; Finkelstein and Perevolotsky 1990; Bailey 2002) . In its high mountain region, pastoralism has been supplemented by a unique Byzantine orchard horticulture (Hobbs 1995; Zalat and Gilbert 2008) and at lower elevations by the cultivation of dates. Agropastoral occupations have always been augmented not only by integrating Bedu into wider trading economies (Marx 2003) . Whilst this has led represented (Rabinowitz 1985) , my 21st century respondents were clear: ' ' (Without his livestock a Bedouin is not a Bedouin!). Herding also links South Sinai residents to their wider identity as members of traditionally pastoralist tribes dispersed across neighbouring regions, and they share with many of their contemporaries the experience both of authoritarian states and of conservation as their agent -what Dawn Chatty (2002) has described as 'conservation without a human face'.
Despite 50 years of political and economic adaptation, then, values grounded in the pre-development building blocks of Bedouin life continue to shape how South Sinai Bedu behave and represent themselves today. These are manifest in an environmental imaginary developed through herding, cultivation and husbanding scarce resources; and in a value system that assigns greater worth to generosity and resource-sharing than to private accumulation. I will argue that both contribute to the self-assigned 'guardian of nature' role discussed below. The Impacts of 'Development' Bedouin and States While Nassef et al. (2009: v.1-4) report that mobile pastoralism can make a
East have sought to settle Bedu in the interests of nation-building (Chatty 2006) . Pastoralists may be treated as second-class citizens or indeed left stateless, and rarely receive the full range of services provided by the state (Jakubowska 2000; Chatty 2003; Marx 2006) . Democratic governments -even those not overtly hostile to pastoralists -may be unable to justify the higher per capita expenditure required to provide a dispersed minority with services (Aronson 1980: 180) , especially, as in Egypt, where settled populations resist assimilating Bedu into the national identity (Altorki and Cole 2006; Gilbert 2011b ).
The Israeli occupation produced a dramatic retrenchment in agropastoral livelihoods. Israel aimed to turn Bedu into 'enthusiastic or productive workers ... accustomed to regular work for wages and acquiring the attitudes, skills and habits valued by an industrial society' (Glassner 1974: 59) . As Bedu settled in order to undertake this work (Marx 1980; Perevolotsky 1981; Perevolotsky et al. from 80 to 13 per family within ten years, and many orchards were abandoned by livelihoods, I will argue, Egyptian rule has had greater impact on shaping the evolution of Bedouin identity.
Following Israel's withdrawal in 1982, Egypt's development of tourism along the Gulf of 'Aqaba, backed by a strong security presence, combined economic goals with the national interest (Aziz 2000) . 'Development and security have always been intertwined', writes Alan Fowler (2008: 112) . 'Security creates the predictable conditions required for investment to translate into economic growth.' The original National Development Plan for Sinai aimed at settling three million million).
7 This neocolonial project was intended both to prevent history from repeating itself and to transform a marginal place of dubious loyalty into an orderly province, peopled with good Egyptian citizens. However, Sinai's residents experience the project as another occupation, the International Crisis Group (ICG) 's (2007: 19) 
Polarization and the Production of Poverty
St Katherine today is a place of growing inequality, due both to the material polarization of its Bedouin communities and to the inequality of opportunity they experience. Egyptian policy ignores their needs -and even their existence -as citizens: I have argued elsewhere that failure to collect information about Bedu 2011b). The poverty resulting from this exclusion is very real. Egyptian employers decline to employ Bedu. The limited education most now receive does not provide access to better employment and most of those working at all survive in low-paid, insecure jobs (Gilbert 2011b ). The steep post-revolution decline in tourist numbers, due in part to media scapegoating of Bedu as criminal, has had a catastrophic effect on desert families, with many now surviving on little more than staple starches and tea. Just as the demise of historic core livelihoods enforces Bedouin dependence on paid work, their access to it is barred both by dominant discourse, the legally unchallenged prejudice of employers, and structural and severe. In South Sinai as elsewhere, insensitive 'development' has led people to see themselves as 'underdeveloped' (Sachs 1992) . This is especially so in St Katherine, where urbanization is focussed. As Rahnema (1992: 159) comments: the necessities of life.' This perception accelerated as tourism boomed and wealth of which Sinai is now part, a Bedouin value system that fails to treat material wealth as the highest good is unintelligible. But Bedouin poverty is not purely a construct of 'development'. South Sinai Bedu have not only learned to feel poor; the erosion of core livelihoods means that many people now actually are poor, not just relatively but absolutely. Half the working population lives around or below the World Bank's poverty standard, and food poverty in South Sinai approaches double that in Egypt, unrecognized by the state (Gilbert 2011b; Gilbert and al Jebaali 2012) .
Structural inequality is compounded for Bedu by increasing polarization within their own society. 'In the past people had very little but they needed very little', an elderly Jebaali explained. 'Now they need a lot. They see things and want them -they want a TV, a fridge, etc.' Some people have succeeded in earning enough to participate in the new order and acquire new tokens of wealth: Chinese motorbikes instead of camels, televisions with satellite dishes, even an occasional computer (Gilbert 2011b) . Of the 15 per cent of respondents who so on the basis that education gave them better opportunities than in the past. The remainder all cited material improvements and services, primarily electricity, motorized transport and the ability to buy commodities that were formerly labour-intensive to produce. People with access to modern commodities, then, are apt to appreciate them: 'There's been a great change for the better', a Jebaali in regular work told me. 'There's work now. People Katherine, forward-looking, younger family men in work are positive about the future and report their personal circumstances to be improving. They include the small number of optimists who see a future for Bedu in which young people will improve their social and material status by studying to work in professions (6%); the government (3%), information technology (6%) or languages (14%). However, they are far outweighed across the whole sample by those who view change as negative and future prospects as limited to handicrafts (12%), tourism (27%) and traditional agropastoral livelihoods (41%). them to change their mindset as well as their livelihood.
Prior to the imposition of what Sachs (1992: 4) calls the 'spreading monoculture' of evolutionist, economized notions of 'development', people used their own yardsticks for judging prosperity. Lummis (1992: 49) notes that the idea of the common good, or 'common wealth', often went hand in hand with co-operative use of resources and moderation in private consumption. These have characterized Bedouin practice: as noted above, wealth has traditionally been expressed through generosity rather than material display, and customary law has provided for both resource sharing and restrictions on resource use in the common interest (Perevolotsky 1987; Hobbs 1995) .
Approaches to life that valorize social values rather than economic wealth are discounted in the process of modernization as contributing to 'underdevelopment'. The global reach of development thinking, Lummis (1992: 48) comments, 'dispossesses the world's peoples of their own indigenous notions of prosperity'. The satellite dishes bringing soap operas and enticing adverts have changed more than just the physical landscape: they have altered people's interior outlook, introducing an individualistic, consumerist ethic at odds with Bedouin norms (Abu-Lughod 1990). As a result, I was told , people now think more about themselves than others, eroding community cohesion: a common response For Bedu, then, the valuing of modern material goods introduced by 'development' is doubly damaging: it both contributes to their assessment by others as 'primitive' (Green 2006: 115) and undermines their self-worth as Bedu. Compromised identity might be counted with the 'existential lacks' noted by Rahnema (1992: 160) 10 A few who feel they have nothing to lose are directly challenging the state. The recent attempts of a Gararsha family to obtain redress for the death of their son at the hands of police has led to a cat-and-mouse war of attrition against the authorities. Tactics include repeatedly cutting the region's communications cables and the disastrously counterproductive 'kidnapping' of Western tourists. The Governor has refused to meet the aggrieved family in this dispute and a heavy-handed police response provokes mounting anger: I received an eyewitness account of the unprovoked beating and shooting by police of an unrelated Gararsha man queuing for petrol.
11 Whilst -in contrast to the more radicalized North -no retaliation by South Sinai Bedu has so far resulted in loss of life, these incidents invariably result in further crackdowns, reinforce anti-Bedouin rhetoric and undermine hopes of constructive engagement.
However, such tactics are the resort of the few. Resistance for the majority is mixed with resignation in the face of insurmountable force -what Appadurai (2004: 81) has called 'the paradox of patience in the face of emergency'.
Narratives of Resistance -Poetry and Stories
By what 'unlikely forms of resistance' (Abu-Lughod 1990: 41) do Bedu negotiate these conundrums? Some are humdrum: a guide told me he had been upset by Western tourists, who then offered to buy him a Nescafé to make up the quarrel. '
' he shouted at them, rejecting the Western commodity. Another everyday leitmotif pits Bedu, as hard, canny desert-dwellers, grow drugs in the mountains with impunity is sometimes put down to the collusion of corrupt police, but more often to the police being too fat to climb up and seize the offenders.
Other methods make higher cultural claims. South Sinai Bedu have always expressed themselves through poetry (Lavie 1990; Bailey 2002; Holes and Abu Athera 2009) . Abu-Lughod (1985) analyses its role as a vehicle for gendered social resistance within Bedouin society; however, in Sinai nowadays its message is as often externally directed, and political rather than personal. Egyptian soap operas and contact with tourists promote a westernized individualism in which emotion need no longer be expressed solely through poetry to avoid loss of honour, as Abu-Lughod describes. However, a mocking the dominant culture or lamenting its impacts still provides entertainment at a public gathering such as a wedding, and brings prestige to its composer. Bedouin oral poetic tradition remains vital today in South Sinai as elsewhere (Bailey 2002 judges in a westernized legal system, leaders suborned by occupiers, and women's roles subverted, amongst others. Lavie demonstrates that through allegorical storytelling the attributes they embody -the protective power of a sheikh, the cunning of a smuggler, the power of a woman in her sphere -can be reinvigorated, their potency restored to listeners whose structures of meaning have collapsed. In confrontation with the occupier, the skills and values that inform Bedouin identity but restoring people's recognition of them as agents of meaning. In my conversations I have looked for moments of heightened meaning such as Lavie describes. They are rare but they are powerful. The stories and events below came to me over a period of four years through a gifted Jebaali storyteller whom I shall call Jema'. In places the stories are critical of Bedu as well as Egyptians. While not presented allegorically they still convey a meaning that bears on identity and illustrates resistance. 
Story 1 (2007). Jema' has hired a builder from Cairo to work on a project, but
it too dangerous. But luckily the ranger is there -Jema' leans forward for the punchline -'Don't worry', the ranger says. 'The Protectorate will investigate.' Story 4 (2006). Jema' is en route to St Katherine from the Suez coast when he spots workers from an Egyptian construction company attacking a venerable acacia on their site. The trees are highly valued by Bedu and grow very slowly. He stops and with his companion gets out to berate the workers, who ignore him. He calls the Protectorate to let them know what is happening, expecting them to action to save the tree. They say they will look into it. On the third day Jema' drives back to the coast. Nothing has been done, and the tree is uprooted at the roadside, destroyed.
Story 1 is an act of moral resistance. It is not just another tale of corruption, which are legion. Jema''s response moves from frustrated acceptance of the policeman's ploy to anger at his effrontery, which is where such stories usually stop. This one goes two steps further, however. First, by giving the policeman money for food, Jema' reverses the power dynamic of the encounter: he leaves having established a superior position. Then, in the telling, his response moves on to the higher moral ground of one who, understanding all, forgives all. The story reverses the usual direction of demeaning judgement, allowing the teller to claim moral authority for the Bedu. In Story 2 Jema' is not teller but protagonist. It shows his passive resistance to an arrogance so brazen it could not be answered in words. By remaining silent Jema' refused to accept charity offered with overbearing insensitivity.
Stories 3 and 4 bear directly on the primary way in which, I shall argue, Bedu differentiate themselves from 'the Egyptians': by rediscovering, or reinventing, a role as guardians of nature. we laugh at their foolishness, but the punchline reverses the target. The Protectorate has power to control the Bedu because its regulations are based on science: rangers have university degrees and run an education programme for Protectorate takes them seriously. 'The Egyptians' are shown to be no more rational than the Bedu they claim to educate, robbing them of legitimacy and thus redressing the balance of moral authority. The same point is made in Story 4, but more acutely. The Protectorate is responsible for protecting the environment, but it neglects its duty. It is the Bedu who see and respond to nature and take an active role in caring for it, while 'the Egyptians' ignore both nature and the Bedu themselves.
A belief in this Bedouin role as guardians of nature permeates the thinking of so many people who spoke with me that I came to see it as central to how Bedu give their lives meaning today. I now examine how Bedu have stressed different aspects of their identity, both to differentiate themselves from those they experience as occupiers, and to draw meaning from aspects of historical identity in order to make sense of the present. I present evidence from my research demonstrating the continuing centrality of nature in shaping both Bedouin identity and relations with the state.
Identity as Resistance
Before 1967, Bedu in South Sinai practised Islam in a singular way. They rarely prayed regularly, but centred their practice on annual pilgrimages to local shrines which reinforced tribal as much as religious identity (Marx 1977) . However, in the mid-1970s, in response to the promiscuity of holidaymakers in newly built Israeli resorts, they became more obviously orthodox. Bedu at the coast tuned their radios to the sermons of Saudi imams, mosques sprang up, and Bedu took of resistance to behaviour that offended their moral values; a selective emphasis on an aspect of their identity that differentiated them from their occupiers.
Ali on Egypt's north coast turn to conservative Islam to resist both the norms of their Bedouin Sinai politicized Islam has little appeal (Gilbert and al Jebaali 2012) . Bedu exhibit varying degrees of piety, but faith has lost its power to differentiate them from the dominant group. So too has language. South Sinai dialects are marker as in other Arab-speaking contexts (Holes 1995 How else, then, might they set themselves apart? Dalby and Mackenzie (1997: 102) explain that a community's resistance to a contemporary external threat may take the form of reconstructing the past, especially where past traditions have been diminished by modernization. This is what Hall and du Gay (1996: 4) 13 mean by the 'invention of tradition' to construct adaptive identities. Prys Morgan (1983) describes how the political suppression of Welsh nationalism led in the 19th century to the invention of a folk tradition; romantic mythologizing providing a future vision for people whose culture had been suppressed. Rather than asserting their identity through faith, I believe South Sinai Bedu today draw pre-development livelihoods. In so doing they reinvent an element of Bedouin identity that persists despite the dramatic decline of those livelihoods.
Environmental Identity: Nature = Life It is challenging to speak of the Bedu's relationship with their environment in a way that avoids romanticizing on the one hand, and borrowing from narratives of primitivism on the other. The process of managing scarce resources has allowed detailed empirical knowledge and ecological expertise to accumulate over many generations (Perevolotsky 1981; Perevolotsky et al. 1989; Hobbs 1995; Zalat and Gilbert 2008) . It is clear from everyday talk and observation as well as my interviews that the natural world impinges constantly on Bedouin life and priorities: the majority of Bailey's (2004) 1,350 proverbs are concerned with it, and 58 per cent of my respondents named natural features as the best-loved aspects of their home. However, such observations are too often used to bolster narratives of the 'Bedu-as-noble-savage', representing them as 'an endangered species' (Hobbs 1996: 12) and legitimizing their consignment, along with their aspirations, to the realm of conservation.
The modern Western separation of 'nature' and 'culture' is culturally conditioned, and does not correspond to the way other people see and categorize their world. Bedu make no such distinction. 'The environment' is the place they live in, the surroundings that facilitate or hamper their ability to conduct their lives alongside its other elements: weather, plants, trees, wildlife, people. I request for an alternative term for (nature, environment) my colleague doggedly insisted on , meaning simply 'life'. He did not assign the landscape 'out there' to a different category, as I did. Local people and researchers have vastly different systems for evaluating the value of plants, animals and natural processes (West et al. 2006: 16) . Lavie (1990: 98 ff.) recounts Bedouin mockery of Israeli academics who came to Sinai to study mice and even rocks, gushing over the beauty of the landscape. A Mzeina sheikh told an Israeli ranger: 'It's great that your government pays you for playing "Nature" .. 
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NOMADIC PEOPLES (2013) VOLUME 17 ISSUE 2 had is this Sinai and that's it. And for our life we have to take from it' (my emphasis). Bedu, then, see people and nature as belonging to an interdependent system which they can legitimately draw on as needed. There is universal acknowledgement that people hunted in the past to feed their families; some admit (Hobbs et in the landscape where they can, and treat themselves and their livestock with medicinal plants. With entitlement to use natural resources, however, comes responsibility towards them, as indicated by customary practice: restricting hunting, grazing and tree-cutting, and providing pools so wildlife can drink. 'Abd el Baset (2005) investigates environmental perceptions in the Jebeliya. Her respondents indicate that they view themselves from an early age as part of an ecological community that includes people. 'Abd El Baset (2005: 30) notes that: '[Respondents] were adamant about wild animals' right to live, and how they were not dangerous as they had their own habitat ... . [W]ild animals do not represent a great danger for them as long as they live in their own place ... . The animals were only active at night time.' Wildlife, in this vision, has its own temporal and spatial 'place' within shared time and space. Predators that stray outside their proper place receive no quarter (Reiss 2001: 53) . This approach enmeshes, as Peet and Watts (1996: 263) express it, 'the social construction of me: 'The Bedu have lived here throughout history. An Egyptian can come here and work, but if we go to Cairo we cannot live our life. It is unnatural' (my emphasis).
The environment is one of many elements that, historically and currently, have affected Bedu, and in response to which they have adapted their aspirations and lifestyle. That said, the Bedouin environmental imaginary ineluctably conditions people's view of themselves as being in contiguous relationship with the natural world. As it was expressed to me, their environment and their life can be denoted by the same word, just as the word ta' (tired, exhausted, sick) is used to describe their gardens parched from lack of water, and their own feelings when way: 'I love it here, partly because it's so quiet, but also because there is a connection between people, the animals and the mountains. You can't get that in town. ' This Bedouin view of nature is ecocentric: according to Stets and Biga (2003: species and objects (such as rivers and forests) that are of worth. When humans act, they must consider environmental forces that may impose constraints on human affairs ... . environment for reasons that are other-oriented. Behaving in an environmentally irresponsible manner can hurt other humans and the biosphere more generally.' An environmental identity, then, is consistent with the resource-sharing and resource-conservation practices espoused by Bedu, and with their emphasis on group rather than individual welfare. 43 per cent of my respondents volunteered that if they could do only one thing they would restore the environment, So people can grow things again'.
Bedu in St Katherine recognized in their Israeli occupiers a similarly ecocentric view.
14 However, Egyptian environmental policy is grounded in anthropocentric high modernism (Mitchell 2002; Gilbert 2011a ). An anthropocentric view means the environment does not have intrinsic value; instead, it is a means to human ends (Stets and Biga 2003: 410) . This approach is well illustrated by the vision statement of StKP itself, which pursues 'the conservation and sustainable development of its natural and cultural resources ... Dalby and Mackenzie (1997: 101) comment that the process of specifying a threat is intrinsically also a process of specifying that which is endangered. By this means the despoiling of nature has increased people's consciousness of their relationship differentiating factor and as a diagnostic of power (Abu-Lughod 1990: 41) . Bedouin opposition to state-led development is seen most clearly in the views people expressed to me about the StKP.
St Katherine Protectorate Singled Out
initiated a seven-year development programme supported by €7.5 million of EU aid (StKPMU 2003) . While managed by the Nature Conservation Sector of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, the Protectorate's administration is located with the Governorate of South Sinai, which also has responsibility for planning, industry, housing, road-building and tourism. Its authority overrules the Protectorate and may overturn its decisions (Grainger and Gilbert 2008: 27) : thus although the Protectorate was given 'police powers' to enforce legislation, two 100 km 2 industrial zones were swiftly set up within its boundaries (StKPMU (NCS 2006: 25) . Community relations deteriorated -unrecognized by the Protectorate itself (Fouda et al. 2006) . The reason, I argue, was the replacement of an international conservation discourse that recognized the knowledge and rights of indigenous people with an evolutionist national discourse that viewed them as troublesome ecological expertise of the Bedu, rebranding it as 'Indigenous Knowledge' to meet current conservation prescriptions, while attempting to 're-educate' the Bedu in environmental protection. It is visible, too, in persistent narratives of Bedouin destructiveness through 'overgrazing' the Protectorate, an assumption and evidence of low grazing impact produced by rangers themselves (Gilbert 2013) .
Egyptian conservation is part of a nation-building project that seeks to assimilate an 'improved' Bedouin population into a modernized state (Gilbert 2013) . It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the most important single perception emerging from the data analysis in this study was negative assessment of the Protectorate, its services and its impact on the environment. Whilst my data revealed diverse attitudes and perceptions, this negative response to state-led remarkably since I avoided leading questions about the Protectorate, or any that asked people to evaluate it. I asked simply whether people lived inside or outside its boundaries; if inside, what services it might provide and how, if at all, it affected them. The questions often unleashed a torrent of ill feeling exceeding any other subject but 'the Egyptians' in general. together revealed a further association between attitude to the Protectorate and respondents' location. People who lived in remoter areas were associated with approval of StKP, positive assessment of its impact on the environment and services, and more positive views of Bedu-state relations. The Protectorate then still provided health and veterinary services in some remote communities, and several people expressed appreciation of those, as well as the freedom and lack of oversight they enjoyed. However, the reverse was also true: that people in urbanized settings or close to South Sinai's only road (a prime site of state control) tended to be negatively disposed toward the Protectorate and its impacts, and unhappy with Bedu-state relations.
The strength of anti-Protectorate feeling indicates that something more is at stake than mere dissatisfaction with services. The failure of conservation matters more to Bedu than other failures. Of all the complaints made about other aspects of 'development' -education, healthcare, even policing -nothing matched the depth of resentment expressed towards the Protectorate. It is, I believe, not a situational but an existential response, to a devaluing of nature that people perceive as extending to them. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Romance and Irony
Bedouin environmental identity draws on the past to make sense of the present -a process well adapted to the paradoxes of modern Bedouin life (see Shryock's 2004 analysis of narratives of Bedouin hospitality in Jordan). It is in a sense a romantic enterprise, invoking a narrative of a harmonious past in which ibex and leopard roamed free and everyone loved each other. The casting of Bedu as environmental angels entails a degree of irony: with consumer goods a recent arrival no customary law governs waste disposal, and Bedouin settlements are often as littered with rusty cans and broken bottles as any Egyptian locale. This does not detract from the power of the idea. Stets and Biga (2003) prominence of an identity depends upon the level of commitment to it and support for it in a community, and the extent to which it brings intrinsic or extrinsic rewards. The extrinsic response to Bedu is generally negative whatever their behaviour, making behaviour almost irrelevant: as Salzman (1980: 9) comments: 'A detailed account of Bedouin ideology would provide a good number of assertions which point to group unity and functioning but seem to have little basis in behavioral reality.' What matters today is the social cohesion reproduced by rediscovering environmental identity as an act of resistance. The counter-myth can in any case be overstated. Since the resumption of Egyptian rule, commentators have consistently reported a loss of interest in conservation among Bedu -possibly to justify conservation interventions (e.g. Hobbs 1996; Hobbs et al. 1998; StKPMU 2003) . It has been assumed that customary resource management (known locally as -grazing areas protected under oath) was a thing of the past. However, my observations were quite different. Over half the people able to apply conservation measures did so. Of the active conservers, 80 per cent were older men; however, one-third of the younger men also reported using been maintained, knowledge of the rules is transmitted along with animal husbandry. Several people mentioned the existence of in their area even 17 This suggests that reports of the death of Bedouin environmental responsibility have been exaggerated. A renewal of environmental identity may be a recent response, but it is arguable that the Bedu-as-conservationist never went away. The second irony is that those who now stress this identity most forcefully are those whose dependence on nature is receding the fastest. People in the wadis who have maintained agropastoral livelihoods, even in an attenuated form, enjoy a greater sense of freedom and wellbeing, despite having access to less cash and fewer facilities, and tend to have a broadly positive outlook. They feel less need to idealize the past because they are still, to some extent, living within its dynamics. Those in the village or on the road, in contrast, are more removed from 'traditional' roles and seek validation as individuals and as a community in the ideal of Bedouin stewardship of nature. Cohen (1985: 99) notes that 'the re-assertion of community ... is often accomplished through precisely those idioms which these circumstances threaten with redundancy'. People in St Katherine have learned from experience that they, and those of their occupiers who might have been their allies, are powerless to stop 'development' from denaturing their environment. By asserting their environmental identity they are trying, against the odds, to prevent it denaturing themselves.
Conclusion
The conservation apparatus in South Sinai has been experienced by Bedu as a means more of control than of environmental protection. state-appointed guardians of the environment to protect it leads Bedu to view today's Protectorate as merely another agent of arbitrary authority, charged with controlling and assimilating them into mainstream Egyptian culture. The structural marginalization of Bedu means they cannot compete for jobs with the Nile Valley Egyptians settling in increasing numbers in the region. The result is growing inequality, with the poverty experienced by many Bedu going unrecorded and unacknowledged by the state. In St Katherine itself and near the road, continual contact with the dominant community and subjection to state authority create stress that may contribute to the higher levels of self-reported illness I found there (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Gilbert 2011a 122 individuals were interviewed in Arabic, usually in their own home, using a wideranging, semi-structured questionnaire. Eighty-two households were also surveyed as to consumer goods and services and food consumption. The resulting qualitative and quantitative data were subjected to Principal Component Analysis, providing a detailed picture of attitudes as well as factual data (Gilbert 2011a 
